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Abstract
Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) in resource-rich countries came to global attention after the food
andfinancial crises of 2008. Previous researchhas assessed themagnitude of these land investments in
terms of land areas acquired. In this study, we analyze the trends in the evolutionof LSLAby framing the
latter as virtual land tradenetworkwith land transactions occurring between2000 and2015, in order to
shed light on the development and evolution of this system.Based on an indexwe introduce to represent
both the numberof countries and size of deals, wediscover threemain phases of trade activity: a steady
increase from2000until 2007 (Phase 1) followedby a peak coincidingwith the food andfinancial crises
between 2008 and 2010 (Phase 2) and concluded by a decline from2011 to 2015 (Phase 3).We identify
73 countries that remained active in land tradingduring all three phases and forma core of land traders
much larger thanpreviously thought.Usingnetwork analysismethods,we group countrieswith similar
trade patterns into categories of competitive, preferential, diversified, and occasional importers or
exporters. Finally, in exploring the changes in investors and their interests in land throughout the phases,
we attribute the evolutionof LSLA to the different stages in the globalization andfinancialization of
different industries. By showing that land investments seem fully integrated as investment strategies
across industrieswe argue for the urgency of better regulationof LSLA so that they also benefit local
populationswithout damaging the environment regardless of their primary purpose.
Introduction
Global demand for land is growing. Currently, more
than 90% of available and accessible global biomass
supply is estimated to be used, while future demand
for terrestrial resources, driven by a growing global
population with rising consumption ambitions, is
projected (if we reach 9 billion people) to surpass this
biomass supply by 2050 (Haberl et al 2007, Run-
ning 2012, Smith et al 2012). In terms of land
requirements, it has been estimated that global crop-
lands, forests and urban areas would have to expand by
4% and up to 11% (from their 2000 baseline areas)
to satisfy this demand by 2030 (Lambin and
Meyfroidt 2011, Hertel 2017). At this rate, available
land resources could be exhausted by the 2050s at the
latest (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011). For some coun-
tries already facing land scarcity problems, this would
mean increasing net imports of natural resources or
acquiring land abroad (Lambin andMeyfroidt 2011).
It is in this context of increasing demand for land
that the phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions
(LSLA) (also referred to as land grabbing) has emerged.
According to Anseeuw et al (2012), LSLA refer to the
practice of leasing or selling land of over 200 hectares in
size to governments or companies. While some have
touted the benefits of such investments for enhancing
agricultural self-sufficiency across theGlobal South, oth-
ers emphasize concerns over the impacts that unregu-
lated LSLAmight have, ranging from the environmental
(e.g. water grabbing, increased deforestation, and land
degradation) (Rulli et al 2012, Clements and Fernandes
2013, Johansson et al 2016) to the social and economic
(e.g. displacement of rural populations and impacts on
livelihoods) (Anseeuw et al 2012, Akram-Lodhi 2015,
Nolte et al2016,Oberlack et al2016).
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Network methods have been used to treat the
LSLA system as a land trade network (LTN), where the
network is defined by aggregating investors by country
of origin, subsequently referred to as land importers,
acquiring land in host countries, or land exporters
(Seaquist et al 2014). In the context of network analy-
sis, the importing and exporting countries are the
‘nodes’ and land acquisitions connecting pairs of
nodes are the ‘edges’ in the network. Such a topologi-
cal map (where topology refers to the connectivity
between nodes in a network) can be effectively ana-
lyzed in order to describe and understand the struc-
ture and behavior of a system. Global trade markets
have been analyzed extensively through the use of net-
work analysis tools as they enable the identification of
patterns and communities (e.g. groupings of countries
with similar trading preferences) within trade net-
works (Serrano and Boguna 2003, Garlaschelli and
Loffredo 2005, Dalin et al 2012, Piccardi and
Tajoli 2012, Seaquist et al 2014, Cingolani et al 2015).
The first wave of global quantitative studies on
LSLA has focused on appraising the scale of global
LSLA and the key countries involved in these transac-
tions. They generally assessed land deals (mostly agri-
cultural) starting from the food and/or financial crisis
of 2008 (Friis and Reenberg 2010, Zoomers 2010, Are-
zki et al 2011, Anseeuw et al 2013). However, most of
these studies have been criticized for primarily focus-
ing on assessing the amount of land acquired globally,
only identifying top players and drawing broad global
conclusions on the drivers and consequences of LSLA
with limited critical discussion of data sampling,
methods or results, and with little appreciation for
latent, potentially informative patterns embedded in
large data sets (Oya 2013, Scoones et al 2013, Zoomers
et al 2016). More recently, some have attempted to
identify determinants of LSLA through econometric
and regression models (Conigliani et al 2018,
Kareem 2018, Lay and Nolte 2018). Yet, in-
depth insights moving beyond data analysis and
contextualizing LSLA within the framework of the
commodification and financialization of nature
remain limited to case studies (Bottazzi et al 2018,
Cavanagh 2018, Vos and Roth 2018, Ogwang and
Vanclay 2019) or more theoretical research (Borras
et al 2012, Margulis 2015, Teklemariam et al 2015,
Anseeuw et al 2017).We thus attempt to bridge the gap
between theoretical or case study research and quanti-
tative analyses by considering transnational LSLA as a
system of interconnected transactions with multiple
actors. In doing so, we go beyond a simple accounting
of global acquired hectares or country rankings.
Moreover, we contextualize such analyses in order to
highlight core issues related to the exploitation of nat-
ure and society, so that responses that mitigate these
problems can be formulated.
Therefore, this paper applies quantitative network
tools on a large land deal dataset (The Land Matrix
Global Observatory 2016) tomake an empirical analy-
sis of when, where, and how much land trading takes
place, as well as by whom. Firstly, we establish a time-
line of land transactions at the global scale in order to
quantify how this phenomenon emerged, changed,
and is still evolving. Secondly, we analyze the spatio-
temporal trends of LSLA in terms of amount of land
exchanged between regions. Thirdly, we explore the
trading patterns of participating countries in the net-
work. This includes both characteristics of individual
countries and the communities they form, based on
the amount of land exchanged and the number of
deals, as well as the number and type of partners with
which each country trades land. We also for the first
time analyze the evolution of investment interests by
companies. We then discuss potential drivers through
the lens of global economic changes and the financiali-
zation of land-based resources in order to shed light
on potential areas of intervention to establish more
sustainable investments respectful of the environment
and local livelihoods.
Methods
Data extraction andnetwork construction
Our global transnational LTN was constructed from
the Land Matrix (LM) database extracted on 9th
March 2016 (The Land Matrix Global Observa-
tory 2016). The database includes information on
2101 deals, of which 1100 were concluded during the
2000–2015 period (either in their start-up phase, in
production, or with no current activity reported)
involving at least one foreign agent (government or
corporation) and amounting to over 43MHa—an area
larger than Sweden. The sizes of deals considered were
those contracted, and in cases where this information
was not available, we considered the operational size,
else the intended size of the deal. If a deal involved
more than one importing country, we divided the size
of land transferred equally between these countries. If
the target country was also involved in the deal, it was
only considered for its role as an exporter, and the total
size of land was divided between the other countries.
This might increase the size of acquired land by the
foreign investors, but since there is rarely any informa-
tion available on ownership shares, we assumed that
the foreign investor would have a strong say on how to
manage the enitre parcel. From these data a graph was
constructed with nodes i N1, 2, ,= ¼ representing
the N 125= countries participating in the land trade
and the L 486= edges (links) corresponding to the
aggregated (volume) land deals between countries
(figure 1). These edges are directed from the exporting
countries (hosting the deals) to the importing coun-
tries (the investors in foreign land) andweighted based
on the total size of land area exchanged between the
two countries (inHa).
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Timeline of land transactions
In order to determine temporal patterns of land trade,
the size of transactions and number of participating
countries were considered on a yearly basis. The deals’
size reflects on the amount of land that is governed
differently as a result of LSLA while the number of
countries is used as an indicator of the spatial
distribution of LSLA. As these quantities do not
correlate perfectly (figure S1 is available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/084021/mmedia), they were
combined into a yearly Activity Index (At ) describing
the annual intensity of land trade (equation (1)). It was
defined for each year as the proportion of land traded
in that year, compared with the total volume of land
traded across the whole period, multiplied by the
proportion of countries participating in the LTN that
year (in other words, land Lt in year t with respect to
the total traded land L Lt t= S during the whole
period, multiplied by the number of countries Ct
participating in the LTN in year t with respect to the
total number of countries C Ct t= S involved in the
LTN):
A
L
L
C
C
. 1t
t t= ´ ( )
We visually inspected the graphical evolution of At to
detect discontinuities in the time series (represented
by the largest increase and first decrease identified),
revealing changes in the state of the network in terms
of amount of land exchanged and/or number of
countries involved. These breakpoints were taken as
boundaries representing major thresholds in the
evolution of the LTN. The network was then disag-
gregated on the basis of these newly identified phases
(figure S2).
Networkmetrics
For each of the three identified phases, we character-
ized the structure of the LTN by using eight indicators
to quantify the features of each country i (table 1). By
combining these metrics, it is possible to define the
role each node plays in the network. This means that
we are able to determine the patterns followed by each
country when acquiring or leasing land (Cooper and
Barahona 2010, Fortunato 2010, Newman 2010). This
corresponds to a multi-criteria ranking and is there-
fore more informative than simply accounting for the
amount of land exchanged. Countries’ roles in the
LTN are thus characterized by the number (figure S3)
and types of partners (figure S4), number of deals
(figure S5) and amount of land exchanged (figure S6).
Determining countries’ roles in the network
We used role-based community detection (Cooper
and Barahona 2010, Berguerisse-Diaz et al 2014) to
classify countries based on their acquisition character-
istics. This requires three steps: first, developing a
measure of similarity to compare country behavior;
second, simplifying the network to retain the most
significant similarities; and finally, optimally parti-
tioning countries with similar behavioral character-
istics into communities whosemembers play the same
role in the network.
To first compare countries, we normalized each
one of the eight networkmetrics (table 1) to lie between
0 and 1 and collect them into an eight-dimensional fea-
ture vector C k k s s n n x y, , , , , , ,i i
in
i
out
i
in
i
out
i
in
i
out
i i= ( )
for each country i, to enable direct comparison between
country pairs. We then quantified the dissimilarity
between countries i and j as the distance between the
Figure 1. Land trade network including all non-domestic deals in the 2000–2015 period. The size of a node (country) represents the
total amount of land exchanged (imported+exported), the color refers to the country classification fromPure Importer to Pure
Exporter. Thewidth of an edge (flow) represents the total amount of land transferred from the target to the investor country and the
color refers to the target country.
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two feature vectors Ci and Cj (the standard Euclidean
distance was used). The greater the dissimilarity, the
greater the difference in characteristics between the two
countries. Figure 2(a) shows that the set of countries
and their dissimilarities can be visualized as a complete
(i.e. all-to-all linked) network, where nodes are the
countries, and edges are weighted with the dissim-
ilarities between country pairs.
To simplify the network to unveil important rela-
tionships, we then removed strong dissimilarities (i.e.
weak similarities). Following Berguerisse-Diaz et al
(2014), we extracted the minimum spanning tree
(MST) from the complete network, namely the subset
of edges having theminimal possible total dissimilarity,
with the constraint of connecting all nodes (i.e. a path
from any node to any other node exists in the MST, see
figure 2(b)). However, to guard against omitting sig-
nificant relationships between country pairs, a proce-
dure was then implemented to re-introduce potentially
important edges in an augmented minimum spanning
tree (AMST), as shown in figure 2(c). In brief, the direct
link between countries i j, ,( ) previously removed when
extracting the MST, is re-introduced into the AMST if
its weight is considerably smaller than the total weight
of the path connecting i j,( ) in theMST. ‘How smaller’
is based on a threshold value f that has to be fine-tuned
(we set f1 5  ): large threshold values come closer
to reproducing the MST, while the original complete
network tends to be restored for small values.
Finally, communities (countries with similar char-
acteristics) were identified using modularity max-
imization (e.g. Fortunato 2010), in which amodularity
value Q 1 expresses the degree of partitioning
between modules. In general, community detection
entails grouping countries into modules based on
similar role features. This was separately applied to all
three phases, and for all values of the threshold para-
meter f associated with the network simplification
procedure described above. The value f 3= max-
imized Q to 0.769, 0.755, and 0.598, for each phase
respectively. The result is a partitioning of countries
into communities (figure 2(d)). We examined the
characteristics of each community and classify them
based on how intensely, frequently and with whom
they engaged in land transactions (competitive, diver-
sified, preferential, and occasional participants in the
land trade) and their most dominant function (land
exporters or importers).
Classification of investors and investment interests
The LM database includes information on the inves-
tors involved in land deals and on their intentions
(The Land Matrix Global Observatory 2016). For the
1100 concluded deals between 2000 and 2015, we
followed the LM intention classification and analyzed
the five categories: agriculture, forest plantation,
biofuels and renewable energy, industrial parks, tour-
ism and conservation.We also considered deals where
the intention was unknown and classify them in an
additional category.
Moreover, we found that 915 investors from mul-
tiple economic sectors were actively acquiring land
during this period. Information on these investors was
gathered from the cited sources for each deal in the LM
database, complemented by information publicly
available on the internet. We classified the investors
based on their main sector of activity: agribusiness,
wood companies (includes logging and processing),
energy companies (includes oil and gas), industrial
companies (includes construction companies), ser-
vices (includes consulting firms and import/export
companies), financial institutions, governmental
institutions and NGOs. Some reported investors were
private individuals without a clear affiliation, these
were added to those companies where no information
could be found and classified as unknown.
Results
Global dynamics: three phases of land trade activity
We identified three distinct phases of land trade
activity based on a temporal analysis of the amount of
Table 1.Country indicators and networkmetrics used for the analysis of the land trade network (e.g. Newman 2010 for details on network
metrics). In the last two rows , wij denotes the amount of land transferred from country i to country j.
Characteristic Indicator Unit Networkmetric Formula
Number of partners Import partners Number of countries in-degree ki
in
Export partners Number of countries out-degree ki
out
Number of deals Import deals Number of land trade
deals
in-deals ni
in
Export deals Number of land trade
deals
out-deals ni
out
Area of land traded Imported land Hectares in-strength si
in
Exported land Hectares out-strength si
out
Type of partners Authority centrality (high if country
imports large amounts fromheavy
exporters)
Index [0, 1] authority xi x w yi j
N
ji j1åa= =
Hub centrality (high if country exports
large amounts to heavy importers)
Index [0, 1] hub yi y w xi j
N
ij j1åb= =
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land exchanged and of the number of countries
involved (figure S1), which we combined to define the
Activity Index (see Methods). Phase 1 extends from
2000 to 2007 and involves 93 countries that exchange
about 8 MHa of land via 186 trade partnerships.
Figure 3(a) shows that the Activity Index increased
slowly from 2000 up until about 2005 after which it
begins to accelerate. Phase 2 starts with the abrupt
acceleration in land trade in 2008, and covers the
period up to 2010. In this phase, 105 countries
exchange more than 21 MHa of land via 257 trade
partnerships. Finally, Phase 3, from 2011 onwards, is a
phase of declining land trade as demonstrated by a
monotonically decreasing Activity Index. It involves
95 countries which exchange about 13MHa of land
through 221 trade relations.
We identified a common core of 73 countries (58%
of the countries) that actively participated in the LTN
across all three phases (figure 3(b)). Moreover, the
strong activity observed in Phase 2 (figure 3(a)) is also
marked by the addition of 25 new countries, 10 of
which remainduring Phase 3 aswell. Finally, inPhase 3,
even though the trade activity decreases (figure 3(a)),
sevennewcountries join the LTN (figure 3(b)). In terms
of trade configuration (here denoting trade flows and
directions between every two partners), diversity in
trading partners is large, as a considerable number of
trade relations are only active during a single phase
(20% in Phase 1, 28% in Phase 2, and 22% in Phase 3)
while a mere 8% of the 486 existing relations persisted
through all phases (figure 3(c)).
Regional dynamics: towards the globalization of Afri-
can landand the expansionofAsian investments
At the regional level, we found that all three phases
were clearly distinct in trade configurations. Phase 1 is
characterized by similar amounts of export flows
(around 20% each) from Latin America, Asia and Eur-
ope, while Africa exports the most land at 33% of the
global total, and Oceania only contributes 5%
(figure 4(a)). We also note that flows are often con-
fined to proximate geographical locations, as 58% of
the trade occurs either within regions (as defined in
figure 4(d)), especially in Asia, or between neighboring
regions (Latin America–North America, Africa–
Europe,Oceania–Asia).
Conversely, we find that Phase 2 is characterized
by heavily globalized land trade whereby the
proportion of intra-regional trade becomes minor
(figure 4(b)). Africa dominates exports (51%, includ-
ing 3% intra-regional trade), while Latin American
shares decrease and Oceania’s shares increase from
Phase 1. Europe and Asia considerably increase their
acquisitions of African land, compared to Phase 1,
whileNorthAmerica focuses onOceania.
Finally, we find that Phase 3 (figure 4(c)) marks a
return to intra-regional trading, especially in Asia
(21%) and Europe (10%), while African land con-
tinues to be transferred globally at a very large rate.
Africa becomes nearly the sole investment region for
North America, and a major one for Asia. Moreover,
Latin America’s contribution to the LTN remains the
same although its main partners are now Asia and
Oceania, which becomes amostly importing region.
Country dynamics: shared behaviors beyond simple
country rankings
The changes in configuration reveal changes in the
land import and export behavior of most countries
throughout the three LSLA phases (see Methods). We
classified countries into distinct groups of four com-
munities (competitive, diversified, preferential and
occasional) across two behaviors (importers and
exporters) (figure 5), based on the role-based commu-
nity detection. Competitive countries are those that
are presented as outliers for all metrics (figures S3–S6).
Diversified countries exchange land in a few deals with
many partners while the preferential countries have
fewer partners with whom they exchange land inmore
deals. Occasional countries are those that only partici-
pate in few deals.
The distribution of the competitive, diversified,
preferential and occasional communities across pha-
ses reveals important distinctions between importers
and exporters. In Phase 1, the largest group is the pre-
ferential for both exporters (22% of countries) and
Figure 2.Apictorial description of the procedure for role-based community detection: (a) the complete (all-to-all linked)network
where nodes are countries and links areweightedwith the dissimilarities in land trade behavior (thinner links denote smaller
dissimilarities, i.e. larger similarities in trade behavior). (b)Theminimum spanning tree (MST), which is theminimal-weight
subgraph connecting all nodes (countries), contains themost important pairwise similarities. (c)The augmentedminimum spanning
Tree (AMST) complements theMSTwith a few significant additional edges (in red). (d)Community detection, conducted on the
AMST, partitions the nodes (countries) inmodules with strong intra-module similarity (here two communities shown in green versus
yellow).
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 084021
importers (16%). It is followed by the occasional
(18%), the competitive (11%) and the diversified (8%)
for exporters and by the diversified (12%) and the
occasional and competitive, with each of these groups
representing 8% of the importing countries
(figure 5(a)). By Phase 2, the proportion of competitive
countries doubles for both importers and exporters
and it becomes the largest group of countries
(figure 5(b)). The next largest groups are diversified
and occasional while the preferential group becomes
the smallest for both exporters and importers. The
main distinction between importers and exporters
occurs in Phase 3 as the largest exporter group remains
competitive followed by preferential and occasional
with no more diversified countries, while the largest
importers group in the occasional closely followed by
preferential and then diversified and finally competi-
tive importers become theminority (figure 5(c)).
Of the 73 countries that are active during the entire
period (figure 3(b)), 18 countries maintain the same
trading behavior across phases, shown in blue in
(figure 6). TheUSA, UK, China, Singapore andMalay-
sia remain competitive importers and Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Indonesia, Cambodia, Mozambique
and Ethiopia competitive exporters. Ten countries
(including Japan, the Netherlands and Angola) only
change community in Phase 2 (most of them become
competitive) as a response to the crisis and go back to
their initial activity type in Phase 3 (shown in orange
figure 6). Another 10 countries (incl. Canada, South
Africa and Ukraine) change communities in Phase 3
(purple in figure 6) and 12 countries change commu-
nities in Phase 2 and maintain their new positions in
Phase 3 too (turquoise in figure 6). These include the
Congo, Tanzania and Ghana that become and remain
competitive exporters. Moreover, 23 countries,
including Korea, Italy and Senegal change behavior in
each phase (yellow in figure 6). Amongst them, 9
countries move between being exporters to importers
of land. These include India and Chile that are expor-
ters in Phase 1 but become importers in Phases 2 and
3, while Russia, Pakistan, Gabon, Kenya and Egypt
become importers in Phase 3 only. Mexico and Zim-
babwe are the only countries that start as importers in
Phase 1, become exporters in Phase 2 and return to
importing land in Phase 3.
Finally, we find that the longest partnerships are
between the 73 core countries except for the one
between Norway and Mozambique that stopped in
Phase 3 and that of Sierra Leone and the UK that star-
ted in Phase 2 (figure 6). Moreover, we find that 34%
of the partnerships occur within regions especially
between Asian countries (Indonesia–Malaysia, Cam-
bodia–Vietnam and China–Laos). Preferential rela-
tions also occur between African and Asian countries
(Ethiopia–India), African and European countries
(Nigeria-UK) and Latin and North American coun-
tries (Peru-USA).
Dynamics of investors and investment intentions:
new industries interested in land-basedproducts
As most of the land deals are enacted by companies
rather than governments (The Land Matrix Global
Observatory 2016), we explore across the three phases
to what extent different economic sectors are inter-
ested in land investments and for which purpose. We
Figure 3. (a)The evolution of the Activity Index At (combining the share of yearly exchanged landwith that of yearly active countries
over 2000–2015) and breakpoints placed at the largest yearly increase of A ,t and at the beginning of the downturn; (b) the number of
countries actively participating in the land trade network during the three phases; (c) the number of active trade partnerships in the
three phases. The same shading in different phases denotes the same set of countries (b) and partnerships (c).
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find that in Phase 1, agribusinesses are the largest inves-
tor group (acquiring 30%of the land), followedbyfinan-
cial institutions (23%) and wood companies (20%)
(figure 7(a)). This distribution changes in Phase 2 where
the majority group becomes forestry (29%) while agri-
businesses and financial institutions lose in acquired
shares even if there was a slight increase in absolute
amounts of land acquired. During this second phase,
energy and service companies as well as governmental
institutions increase their share of acquired land. More-
over, private and unknown investors acquire more land
during this phase than any other. Finally, in Phase 3,
most groups return to their Phase 1 shares, especially
agribusinesses dominating with 36% of the acquired
land. This time, the wood industrymoves back to fourth
place, behind other industries and financial institutions
that both acquire 17%of the traded land.
In terms of deal intentions, the dominance of agri-
culture is striking in Phases 1 and 3 representing 56%
of all land acquired and even if it drops to 29% in
Phase 2, it is still the largest intention during the crisis
period (figure 7(b)). Biofuels and renewable energies
as well as forest plantations are the other most com-
mon intentions in Phase 1 (11% and 22% respectively)
and Phase 3 (9% and 17%). Phase 2 is characterized by
more diversification in investment intentions, high-
lighted by the increase in the proportion of biofuels
and renewables as well as conservation and tourism
(which remains considerable in Phase 3 too). During
the crisis period, the fraction of the land for which the
intention is unknown is largest (19% against 6% in
Phase 1 and 15% in Phase 3).
Discussion
In this study, we have presented an integrated spatio-
temporal analysis of transnational LSLA at global,
regional and country scales. We have identified, three
main phases of trade activity in the global LTN: Phase 1
between 2000 and 2007, Phase 2 between 2008 and 2010
and Phase 3 between 2011 and 2015 (figure 3(a)). These
are consistent with the findings of Nolte et al 2016 who
identified an acceleration starting 2005 and a slow-down
from 2012 by looking at the number of deals and area
under contract. The rest of our analysis however is always
embedded within these three identified phases, enabling
us to highlight shifts in the locations and intentions of
LSLA throughout time.
We have thus shown that land trade started
between geographically proximate locations in Phase
1, became more global in Phase 2 and returned to
more regional trade in Phase 3 (figure 4). While pre-
vious analyses present a clear North–South divide
between land importers and exporters (Anseeuw et al
2012, Weinzettel et al 2013, Seaquist et al 2014, Cos-
cieme et al 2016), we showed that land trade activity
can be better understood if divided in three phases. It
then appears that North–South trade only dominated
land exchange during Phases 1 and 2, while we found
increasing South–South trade starting Phase 2, and
especially within Asia in Phase 3 and between Africa
and Asia in Phases 2 and 3 (figure 4). Finally, because
these trade patterns seem to follow those of merchan-
dize trading (WTO 2015, Gasparri et al 2016), we
further hypothesize that land exchanges could be
Figure 4.Regional land trade: countries are aggregated by their geographical position (regions are defined in (d) according to theUN
classification (UnitedNations 2016). The three circles, drawnwithCircos (Krzywinski et al 2009), refer to Phase 1 to 3 in the land trade
network, with the total volume of land traded shown for each phase. The size of the links represents the proportion of exported land
from the region of origin to partner regions, over the total amount of exchanged land for each phase. The color of the links represents
the region of origin. For readability, the sizes of the three circles are drawn equally and thus do not represent the actual amount of total
traded land.Only flows of at least 1%of the total trade are shown for each phase.
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facilitated by already existing trade agreements, whe-
ther they be regional or preferential at the WTO
(WTO 2016). However, this hypothesis deserves fur-
ther investigation.
To identify country roles in the LTN, we went
beyond ranking countries based on number of part-
ners or total amount of land exchange to analyze how
their overall trading characteristics changed between
Figure 5.Evolution of countries’ trade characteristics, based on the role communities identified viamaximummodularity (see
Methods) in (a)Phase 1, (b)Phase 2 and (c)Phase 3. Competitive countries are those that rank the highest on land exchanged, number
of deals, number and types of partners. Diversified countries havemany partners and fewer deals while preferential countries are the
opposite. Occasional countries only trade land in one or two deals. The three networks correspond to theAMST described in the
Methods section (seefigure 2). The size of the nodes is representative of the total land trade of the country. Edges connect countries
based on their role similarity and the thickness of the edges represents the strength of the similarity.
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competitive, preferential, diversified and occasional
importers or exporters (figure 5). We found that the
USA, UK, China, Singapore and Malaysia were com-
petitive importers across 2000–2015, while Ethiopia,
Brazil, Mozambique, Argentina, Uruguay, Indonesia
and Cambodia were competitive exporters (figures 5
and 6). Furthermore, previous analyses have often
focused on the activity of a small group of countries
while our more holistic community detection
approach identified a larger core of 73 countries
actively trading land during all three phases (figure 6).
Other countries were more dynamic in their role,
including many countries that changed roles from
phase to phase (figures 5 and 6).
Finally, we have for the first time presented a glo-
bal account of the different economic sectors inter-
ested in land as well as their intended use for it. We
found that over time, agriculture was always the domi-
nant intended land use but we also noted an increase
in the proportion of land dedicated to biofuels, forests
and conservation in Phase 2 especially, but also in
Phase 3. We also highlighted the growing interest in
land by new actors including industry, services and
NGOs after the crisis (figure 7).
Overall, our analysis supports the importance of
looking at the three phases we have identified when
studying global or regional land acquisitions to draw
more accurate conclusions. Following our approach
to explore changes in trade relationships, actors
involved at country and investor levels, and in invest-
ment interests over timemay also help address some of
the critiques to previous quantitative evaluations of
LSLA at global level that are considered too simplistic
and sometimes inaccurate (Oya 2013, Scoones et al
2013, Zoomers et al 2016).
What drove the three phases of large-scale land
acquisitions?
Our analysis of observed patterns of land trade, and
our observation of its three distinct phases from
2000–2015, cannot explain why these patterns
occurred. However, here we will propose a coherent
interpretation for global trends by filling the gap
between our empirical analysis and more theoretical
Figure 6. Summary of role changes in the land trade network. Countries are grouped by phase of activity. Node size is proportional to
the total amount of land exchanged; color indicates duringwhich phase a change in countries’ role occurs (e.g. ‘In Phase 2’means that
a country had the same role in phases 1 and 3 but not in Phase 2while ‘FromPhase 2’means that a country had one role in Phase 1 and
a different one in Phase 2which remained the same in Phase 3). Lines denote partnerships ofmore than 4 years between countries, and
thickness represents the duration of the partnerships.
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studies. Our interpretations still need to be more
rigorously tested in future research.
We hypothesize that the interest in land in Phase 1
can be attributed to changes in corporate structures
and mounting globalization and competition in the
early 2000s following the global wave of privatization,
free market integration and adjustment policies in dif-
ferent sectors during the 1980s and 1990s (Zoomers
2010, Lay and Nolte 2018). New business models such
as product diversification, outsourcing schemes, and
vertical integration of supply chains were adopted by
increasingly larger transnational corporations espe-
cially in the agro-food industry (Friedmann 2005,
Gereffi et al 2005, Gibbon et al 2008, Reardon et al
2009, De Schutter 2011a, Anseeuw et al 2017). These
trends were further reinforced by the rise of financiali-
zation of natural resources. For example, food pro-
ducts became subject to commodity swap contracts
for derivative agricultural markets (Burch and Lawr-
ence 2009, Clapp and Helleiner 2010, Anseeuw et al
2017); flex crops (e.g. biofuels produced from food
crops) provided new speculation havens for commod-
ity traders (Sorda et al 2010, Borras et al 2014, Her-
tel 2017, Genoud 2018); and forest products were
financialized through payment for ecosystem services
and carbon sequestrations schemes, and used as assets
in a new carbon market (Fairhead et al 2015,
Hertel 2017, Conigliani et al 2018,Mehrabi et al 2018).
The food and financial crisis in Phase 2 may have
driven increases in land investment for food produc-
tion (e.g. governments concerned with their own food
and energy security such as Japan, Korea and the Gulf
countries), as well as encouraged new actors to enter
the LTN such as the services sector and other indus-
tries (figure 7), whomay perceive land as amore secure
asset than financial markets (Friis and Reenberg 2010,
Zoomers 2010, Arezki et al 2011, De Schutter 2011b).
The financial crisis may have pushed many of the
poorer countries into competition for attracting for-
eign investments, as these are perceived as a major
road to development (World Bank 2007, Cotula et al
2009,Deininger 2011, Karlsson 2014).
We speculate that the strong decline in land trad-
ing seen in Phase 3 may be due to the decreased
urgency of hedging funds in land after the financial
crisis, as well as increasing concerns about the risks of
large-scale land acquisitions. Since 2010, there is
increasing research documenting unsustainable prac-
tices arising from LSLA, such as deforestation, land
and water degradation, as well as displacement and
marginalization of rural labor (Li 2011, Rulli et al 2012,
Clements and Fernandes 2013). The heavy publicity of
the land rush during Phase 2, together with increasing
civil society awareness, helped lead international orga-
nizations including the UNCTAD, IFAD, FAO and
World Bank to develop the Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investments in 2010 (Deininger et al
2010) which were formally adopted in 2014. These
Principles include contributing to food security and
nutrition, to economic development and poverty alle-
viation, and respecting land tenure (Committee on
World Food Security 2014). Furthermore, due to
Figure 7.Distribution of companies’ acquisitions (total amount of land acquired) by (a) sector of activity (classified from the internet
searches) and (b) intention of investment (reported by the LandMatrix).
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massive protests, that resulted for example in the gov-
ernment overthrow in Madagascar after the failed
Daewoo Logistics deal (Ratsialonana et al 2011), many
exporting countries have reconsidered their strategies
such as the government of Papua New Guinea that
finally revoked and declared special land leases illegal
in early 2017 (COI SABL 2013, Orere 2017). Thus,
there is both less incentive for investing countries to
acquire land, and more resistance in exporting coun-
tries to participate in the LTN. This however does not
mean that land is not being acquired anymore but
rather that the number and size of deals shrank con-
siderably. Moreover, Nolte et al (2016) attribute this
decline to a potential time lag in deal reporting and
further emphasize that more deals have moved to a
production stage from the end of Phase 2, andmore so
during Phase 3.
Uncertainties and limitations
Although we used data from the LM, which represents
significant effort into verifying the reliability of the
information on deals reported (Anseeuw et al 2013,
Nolte et al 2016), there is uncertainty related to global
studies of LSLA due to limitations on the comprehen-
siveness of the data. To draw the strongest possible
conclusions, we studied only deals that were con-
cluded (not failed) and contracted (not intended); we
may therefore have missed some deals that did go
ahead but were not reported. We also only considered
deals that have at least one foreign investor, so we do
not capture purely domestic LSLA that are more
present in Latin America for example.
Our choice to consider total rather than propor-
tional amount of land exchangedmay emphasize larger
exporting countries (figures 4 and 5), but was necessary
to maintain consistency between in- and out-strength.
We tested this difference and found its effect to be very
small on our classification,with a few exceptions (figure
S7). Finally, as the maximummodularity method used
to partition countries according to their role does not
always detect a sharp separation among groups, there
might be exceptions for each grouping of countries, i.e.
the classification of some minor country in one group
or another could beuncertain.
Finally, even though transnational LSLA are
mostly enacted by companies rather than govern-
ments, we nevertheless aggregated the investors by
country of origin. This was done in an effort to main-
tain symmetry between the nodes in the network.
While a network analysis of companies could provide
valuable insights into LSLA, it would not have yielded
significant results in the community analysis as very
few companies engage in more than one deal. Instead
we have presented the activity of different actors (by
sector of activity of investors) across the different pha-
ses and highlighted the rise of financial entities during
the crisis period and the emergence of the services sec-
tor in Phase 3.
Conclusion
We have shown that LSLA preceded the food and
financial crises, and that they have continued after-
wards, thus contradicting the basic assumption that
LSLA is a response to the crisis of 2008 and demon-
strating the importance of analyzing time periods of
the land trade phenomenon. We identified 73 coun-
tries actively trading land during the entire period, 11
of which remained the most competitive importers
and exporters while the others changed trading
strategies. We hope future research will investigate
these roles in exploring the drivers and consequences
of LSLA. Finally, in exploring the dynamics of the
actors involved in LSLA and the intended use of the
land throughout time, we contextualized the evolution
of LSLA within broader changes in global economics
and argued that land investments form a new way of
doing business that is widespread across industries. As
such, we believe that existing voluntary guidelines over
the unsustainability of LSLA do not go far enough to
ensure that land deals provide benefits for the local
people and places where they occur. We have shown
that LSLA appear to now be fully embedded across
economic sectors, implying it is not only direct land
transactions that need monitoring, but also financial
investments in the agriculture, energy, forestry, and
conservation sectors thatmay be targeted for acquiring
land.
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